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Regulation of the Pay Television Market:
Why A La Carte Cable is not the Solution but Giving the
FCC More Power is
Jacob Moak'
INTRODUCTION
Cable television subscribers in major television markets, including New York
and Los Angeles, recently faced a blackout of "America's most-watched network."
2
Time Warner Cable, "the second largest cable [television] provider" in the United
States,' and CBS fought over the retransmission consent fee that Time Warner
must pay in order to broadcast CBS content.4 The blackout meant that Time
Warner Cable subscribers in these markets could not watch many of television's
highest rated programs induding NCIS and The Big Bang Theory.' The blackout
lasted a month causing damage to both sides.6
While this blackout might seem like a minor disruption to cable television
subscribers, the blackout shows a greater problem within the pay television market.
Pay television has roughly 100 million subscribers.7 A pay television subscription is
not cheap and represents a large portion of many American families' discretionary
'University of Kentucky College of Law, J.D. Candidate 2015.
2 Michael Calabrese, The CBS-Time Warner Cable Blackout Battle: Time for Congress to Rescue
the Hostages, SLATE FUTURE TENSE BLOG (Aug. 9, 2013, 4:58 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/fut
ure-tense/2013/08/09/cbstime_warnercable_blackoutcbattlescongressshouldrescue-hostages.html.
3 Our Company Company Overview, TIME WARNER CABLE, http://www.timewarnercable.com/
en/about-us/company-overview.html (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
' See Bill Carter, CBS Returns, Triumphant, to Cable Box, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 2, 2013,
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/03/business/media/cbs-and-time-warner-cable-end-contract-
dispute.html?_r=0.
s Big Bang Theory Extended to 2016-2017: Multi-Year Pick Up, CBS (Mar. 12, 2014, 9:50 AM),
http://www.cbs.com/shows/big-bang-theory/news/1002098; Neil Hughes, CBS Spat with Time
Warner Cable Extends Outage to Network's Official iPad, iPhone Apps, APPLEINSIDER (Aug. 5,
2013, 8:55 AM), http://appleinsider.com/articles/13/08/05/cbs-spat-with-time-warner-cable
-extends-outage-to-networks-official-ipad-iphone-apps; Rick Kissell, 'NCIS' Has Become World's
Most-Watched TV Drama, VARIETY (June 11, 2014, 1:45 PM),
http://variety.com/2014/tv/news/ncis-most-popular-drama-in-worldwatched-tv-drama-1201218492.
6 See Todd Spangler, Time Warner Cable Lost Subscribers During CBS Blackout, VARIETY (Sept.
12, 2013, 02:03 AM), http://variety.com/2013/biz/news/time-warner-cable-lost-subscribers-during
-cbs-blackout-1200608744.
7 See Matt Yoder, ESPN President John Skipper Scoffi at A La Carte Prospects, AWFUL
ANNOUNCING (Sept. 26, 2013, 4:26 PM), http://www.awfiannouncing.com/2013/september/espn
-president-john-skipper-scoffs-at-a-la-carte-prospects.html; see also IPTV Defies Drop in US Pay-TV
Market to Gain Subscribers in Q2, IHS PRESSROOM (Aug. 14, 2013, 4:29 PM),
http://press.ihs.com/press-release/design-supply-chain-media/iptv-defies-drop-us-pay-tv-market-gain
-subscribers-q2 [hereinafter IHS].
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income. Blackouts, such as the one imposed by the Time Warner/CBS dispute,
prevent American pay television subscribers from realizing the true value of their
subscriptions. In addition, after blackouts, consumers lose again by being forced to
pay more for their current subscriptions.' The current regulatory scheme is not
sufficient to protect consumers from the disruption of a blackout or the rising
prices associated with them.9 As a result, new laws are needed to prevent similar
blackouts.
This Note seeks to address the problems with the current regulatory scheme for
the pay television market and to show potential solutions for service blackouts and
rising pay television rate subscriptions. While there are many competing solutions
regarding the best way to fix the problems, this Note will focus on three potential
solutions: the potentially radical solution of d la carte cable, the less radical solution
of providing injunctions for interim carriage and/or forced binding arbitration, and
the germane solution of additional regulations to the existing marketplace. Part I of
the Note will focus on the current regulatory framework and market conditions of
the pay television market. Part II will discuss the potential solutions to the
blackout. Finally, Part III will discuss why providing injunctions for interim
carriage and/or forced binding arbitration is the best solution to the blackout
problem.
I. CURRENT LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND MARKET CONDITIONS
OF THE PAY TELEVISION MARKET
A. Types of Pay Television
Television began primarily as a broadcast model where television stations
broadcasted their signal free over the air.'" This model, which still exists today,"
favored geographic areas close to major cities.' 2 In the 1940s, cable television
developed as a solution for communities unable to receive broadcast television
signals because of terrain or distance from broadcast television stations. 3 To solve
the problem of reception, cable television operators placed antennas in locations
with suitable reception to receive broadcast signals. 14 From there, this signal could
then reach subscribers by coaxial cable for a fee." Cable television signified the first
true instance of people paying a subscription to watch television. Since the
See Carter, supra note 4.
9 See id.
10 See Evolution of Cable Television, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/encyclopedia/evolution-cable
-television (last updated Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter FCC].
" Anyone with "rabbit ears" on the back of their television can attest to the fact that they can
receive broadcast channels for free over the air; however, they still need to be located close to a broadcast
station, usually in a larger city, in order to pick up a signal.
2 See id. (noting cable television operators picked up broadcast station signals in areas with good
reception and distributed them).
13 Id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
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introduction of cable, pay television has become a major source of entertainment
for millions of families.
In addition to cable television, there are two other major technologies that
provide pay television services: satellite and Internet Protocol Television (IPTV).
Satellite television involves a receiver, such as a satellite dish, which receives signals
from space that are then communicated to a television. 6 The concept of satellite
television has existed since the 1960s;'" however, satellite television really exploded
onto the scene in the 1990s as a major player in the pay television landscape. 8
Satellite television helped solve some of the same problems as cable such as a lack
of signal due to terrain and/or distance. Between the two largest providers,
DirecTV and Dish Network, there are now roughly 34 million subscribers. 9
The final major form of pay television is IPTV. IPTV is a service offered by
some telecommunications companies, notably Verizon and AT&T, in which
television service is provided over the Internet instead of by coaxial or fiber optic
cable.2" This type of pay television is the most recent addition to the marketplace.
These three major types of pay television services make up the pay television
market. All pay television products are remarkably similar. While there are some
differences with regard to market limitations, all three technologies share the
problem of blackouts and the rising subscription costs associated with them.
B. Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
While the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter FCC) asserted
its ability to regulate the cable industry in the 1960s and 1970s,2 Congress did not
truly exercise that ability until 1984. At that time, unlike today, the pay television
marketplace consisted almost entirely of cable television. Congress first regulated
the cable industry with the Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984.22 Congress
passed the law to deregulate the pre-1984 market in order to "foster the growth of
16 See Christopher Klein, The Birth of Satellite TV, 50 Years Ago, HISTORY (July 23, 2012),
http://www.history.com/news/the-birth-of-satellite-tv-50-years-ago.
17 See id.
1s See Paul Richter, New Satellite-to-Home TV Serice Due in 1993: Broadcasting: Four Firms
Back $1-Billion Sky Cable Venture: The System Could Carry up to 108 Channels, L.A. TIMES, Feb.
22, 1990, http://artides.latimes.com/1990-02-22/news/mn-1704_1_cable-operator ("Four top media
and communications companies Wednesday disclosed plans for a television service that they say will be
bouncing dozens of channels off satellites and into American homes by late 1993).
19 See Todd Spangler, DirecTV Adds 93,000 U.S. Subscribers in Q4, But Growth Slows as Fees
Keep Rising, VARIETY (Feb. 20, 2014, 5:05 AM), http://variety.com/2014/biz/news/directv-adds
-93000-u-s-subscribers-in-q4-but-growth-slows-as-fees-keep-rising-1201113787 (noting that
DirecTV "ended 2013 with 20.25 million subscribers"); DISH Network Reports Third Quarter 2013
Financial Results, DISH (Nov. 12, 2013, 4:01 AM), http://about.dish.com/press-release/financial/dish
-network-reports-third-quarter-2013-financial-results (reporting a subscriber base of 14.049 million).
20 See Bradley Mitchell, IPTV, ABOUT TECHNOLOGY, http://compnetworking.about.com/od/
homenetworkuses/g/bldef.iptv.htm (last visited Nov. 12, 2014); see also IHS, supra note 7.
21 See FCC, supra note 10.
22 Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-549, 98 Stat. 2779 (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
20i4-2015]
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the cable industry."23 Another important goal of the law "prohibit[ed] telephone
companies from entering the cable business."24 While much of this law was
replaced by later legislation, the law developed the three-tiered jurisdictional
regulatory system seen today in which federal, state, and local officials all play a role
in the cable industry.2"
The 1984 law accomplished some of its policy goals. For instance, "the number
of households subscribing to cable television increased,"26  unfortunately,
"[h]owever, competition among distributors of cable services did not."27 In
addition, for many places around the country, "the rates for a cable subscription far
outpaced inflation."2" As a result, Congress responded to these issues with the
Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992.29
C. Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992
Congress passed the Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition
Act of 1992 to address the competitive imbalances and consumer abuses resulting
from deregulation brought about by the 1984 law.30 The law, passed over the veto
of President George H. W. Bush, attempted to increase competition in the pay
television marketplace by restructuring it. 3' The most important parts of the law
were rate regulation, must-carry provisions, and retransmission consent.
32
First, the law provided for rate regulation in areas without effective
competition.33 This represented a radical change from the 1984 law, which
primarily focused on deregulation of the industry. The law allowed for federal
regulation of both basic cable and higher programming tiers. 34 The FCC was
placed in charge of ensuring that rates were not excessive. 3' By regulating the prices
of cable subscriptions, Congress hoped to level the playing field by reducing
consumer cost and increasing competition. 36 In this way, market players could
theoretically be prevented from having "undue market power."
37
23 MULTICHANNEL VIDEO COMPLIANCE GUIDE: BROADBAND LAW & REGULATION 100,
101 (2013) [hereinafter VIDEO COMPLIANCE GUIDE], available at 2004 WL 4110825.
24 Id. 100.
" See id.
26 3 FREDERICK K. GRITTNER & MARK A. ROTHSTEIN, FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE
PRACTICE § 3528 (3d ed. 2002).
27 Id.
2s FCC, supra note 10.
29 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106
Star. 1460 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
3
0 VIDEO COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 23, 100.
31 Id. 101.
32 Id. at 100.
33 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 2-3.
14 Id. at § 3.
35 Id.
36 See 3 GRITTNER & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 26.
37 Id.
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Second, Congress enacted must-carry provisions." Must-carry provisions can
force cable operators to carry local commercial and non-commercial broadcast
signals.39 The idea behind the must-carry provision is that local broadcasters can
force cable operators to put the broadcaster's programming on a cable operator's
channel lineups. Recall that television started out as a broadcast model where
signals were distributed free over the airwaves to people.4" With cable, the signals
are gathered up and sent to paying subscribers. If there were no must-carry
provisions, then cable operators could exclude broadcast programming from their
lineup. Must-carry rules prevent this possibility by forcing cable companies to carry
a particular channel or channels that the broadcast station elects. In doing so, the
law preserves the original broadcast model of television. The technical details of the
must-carry provision are somewhat complicated, but most local television stations
(commercial, non-commercial, or educational) qualify for must-carry status.
41
Finally, Congress amended the Communications Act of 1934 with regard to
retransmission consent.42  Retransmission consent is the process by which
broadcasters give their written consent to allow cable operators to include their
programming on the cable operator's lineup.43 A pay television provider cannot
show programming without retransmission consent. 44 Thus, retransmission consent
works concurrently with must-carry provisions by setting up a choice for local
broadcast television stations. Broadcast stations can either elect must-carry or can
negotiate with a pay television provider for retransmission consent. 4 Thus, the law
ensures that local broadcast television is available for cable subscribers by either
requiring a cable to company to carry the broadcast station for free or, if the
broadcast station has leverage, to require payment for retransmission consent.46
Retransmission consent is the key provision of the law, still in existence today, that
leads to blackouts of coverage of broadcast television stations such as the recent
Time Warner/CBS blackout.
D. Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Role of the FCC
The last major legislation affecting the cable industry is the
Telecommunications Act of 1996. 4 1 In stark contrast to the 1992 law, this law was
largely deregulatory in nature and as a result, cable rate regulation mostly came to
" Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act §§ 4-5.
39 Id.
40 See supra text accompanying note 10.
41 See FCC, supra note 10. The FCC indicates that cable operators, if they have more than twelve
stations in their lineup, must reserve up to a third of their line-up for must-carry status. Id. As a result,
most local commercial broadcast stations and educational stations are included. Id.
42 VIDEO COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 23, 102.
4 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 6.44
1d.
4 See id.
46 See Calabrese, supra note 2.
4 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2014-2015]
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an end.4" Federal oversight of rate regulation was greatly reduced by limiting
regulation only to basic cable (not higher tiers) and only in locations in which
adequate competition does not exist.4' Congress however, did not remove the
ability of local authorities to regulate basic cable rates.5' Thus, local authorities play
an increased role in ensuring that rates are not excessive. Another large change was
the elimination of certain ownership restrictions such as prohibiting telephone
companies from participating in the cable industry.5
This piece of legislation is the last major law for the cable industry. It is unlikely
that Congress would have been able to foresee developments in the industry such as
the recent rapid consolidation of pay television providers. While the 1996 law
largely deregulated the industry, many of the major provisions from the 1992 law
remained in place. For example, Congress did not modify must-carry rules or
retransmission consent.52 As a result, this structure, which allows blackouts,
remains today.53 Thus, some analysts posit that the current state of the law is
outdated.
4
E. Current Market Conditions and How They Lead to Blackouts
As mentioned above, there are three primary types of pay television: cable,
satellite, and IPTV. The 1984, 1992, and 1996 laws were primarily directed
towards cable companies and not satellite or IPTV. While some of the provisions,
such as retransmission consent, apply to all three types of services, the majority
targeted cable companies. So, to understand the marketplace, the cable market
must be looked at first.
Federal, state, and local officials all have influence over the cable policy of a
particular geographic location.55 Each jurisdictional level plays a role in setting the
market for cable television.56 Starting at the state level, there are various approaches
states take for regulation. For instance, Massachusetts has a comprehensive system
for regulating cable television through a state commission.57 Another approach that
some states maintain involves allowing public utility commissions to regulate cable
4 3 GRIY'1NER & ROTHSTEIN, supra note 26, § 3529.
4 Telecommunications Act § 301.
50 See id.
s Id. § 302. This part of the law set the stage for companies like Verizon and AT&T to offer video
programming. Congress had been reluctant until this point to allow phone companies to make such
offerings because of potential consolidation of the industry. This might have been a reasonable concern
since the pay television marketplace is rapidly consolidating. See David Gelles, Big Offer for Time
Warner Cable Unsettles the Cable Industry, N.Y. TIMES,Jan. 13, 2014, http://dealbook.nytimes/com/
2014/01/13/time-warner-cable-gets-61-3-billion-offer/.
52 See Calabrese, supra note 2.
" See id.
14 See id.
" See FCC, supra note 10.
16 See id.
17 See id.
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and cable rates."8 Nonetheless, the most common approach is for cable to be
regulated by local governments. 9 Usually, states have laws dealing with franchising
and related issues,6" but the rest is left to local governments.
Because this system is the most prevalent, local governments have a tremendous
amount of influence on the cable market. Local governments, called "local
franchising authorities, "" are responsible for granting franchises to cable operators
to operate in a local area.62 Federal law dictates that local franchising authorities
may grant one or more franchises within their jurisdiction.63 A local "franchising
authority may not grant an exclusive franchise and may not unreasonably refuse to
award an additional competitive franchise."64 Since 1996, the local franchising
authority has been responsible for the regulation of basic cable rates. 65 Thus, any
issues with high prices must be taken up with the local franchising authority.66 The
federal government, through the FCC, can only regulate basic cable rates in areas
without effective competition or in areas with small cable operators. 67 As a result,
local authorities-not state or federal-determine both regulation of pricing and
franchising.
At the federal level, the FCC is in charge of implementing federal
communications policy relating to cable television. 6' Nonetheless, the FCC mainly
plays an oversight role. While the FCC helps to enforce must-carry provisions and
basic cable price regulation in places without competition, 69 the FCC has a limited
ability to intervene in retransmission consent battles.7" Retransmission consent is
obtained through private negotiations. 7 The FCC lacks real teeth to do much of
anything during a blackout and can essentially only make sure that companies
negotiate in good faith.72 The FCC does not have the ability to provide for an
injunction of blackouts or force binding arbitration and, as a result, must largely
stand on the sidelines when battles over retransmission consent occur.
73
58 Id.
59 See id.
60 See id.
61 Id.
62 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 7(a), 106 Stat. 1460, 1483 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 541(a)(1) (2012)).
63 See id.
6 Id.
65 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 301, 110 Stat. 56, 115-116 (codified
as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 543 (2012)).
66 FCC, supra note 10.
67 Id.
68 Id.; VIDEO COMPLIANCE GUIDE, supra note 23, 100.
69 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act §§ 3-5.
0 See Press Release, FCC, FCC Takes a Fresh Look at Its Retransmission Consent Rules in Light
of Recent Consumer Television Disruptions (Mar. 3, 2011) [hereinafter Press Release], available at
2011 WL 765091, at *2.
71 See Carter, supra note 4; see also Press Release, supra note 70, at *6.
72 See 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(a) (2013); Press Release, supra note 70, at *1-2, 4, 6.
v Press Release, supra note 70, at *1 - 2 , 4.
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The current framework for cable television means that each of the three
jurisdictional levels plays a role in creating the current marketplace.74 Around much
of the country, cable franchises are granted on a location-by-location basis.
75
Various communities, even neighboring communities, may have different
providers. The cable market, as a result, is fragmented on a national level.76 The
primary reason for this is the huge infrastructure cost associated with building,
maintaining, and operating a cable system.77 Cable systems are expensive because
they require significant amounts of equipment and physical capital for services to be
distributed to customers.7" While local authorities may grant more than one
franchise in any location, the costs associated with building a network prevent
competition in most markets. Thus, in most places around the country, there is
only one cable provider. Nonetheless, even with the fragmented nature of the cable
industry, the cable market has consolidated rapidly in the last few years.79 The
primary reasons for this consolidation are retransmission consent battles and
increasing competition with satellite and IPTV providers."s Consolidation allows
for increased bargaining power with content providers and less competition in the
market."
Cable's competition primarily comes from satellite and IPTV services.
8 2
Satellite providers operate nationwide and are not subject to local franchising
authorities like cable companies.8 3 Satellite television is currently the only form of
pay television that can essentially be purchased from any location in the country.
While putting satellites in space is extremely expensive, little terrestrial physical
infrastructure is required. A satellite subscriber only needs a power source, a
satellite dish with a clear sky, and a television in order to receive this form of pay
television. This is unlike cable, which requires a substantial terrestrial physical
"' See FCC, supra note 10.
75 See id.
76 See Cable and Other Pay Television Services, HIGHBEAM BUSINESS, http://business.highbeam.
com/industry-reports/transportation/cable-other-pay-television-services (last visited Nov. 12, 2014).
77 See Kate Cox, Why Starting a Competitor to Comcast is Basically Impossible, CONSUMERIST
(May 10, 2014), http://consumerist.com/2014/05/10/why-starting-a-competitor-to-comcast-is-basical
ly-impossible; Jay Yarow, How Much It Would Cost Google to Become a National Cable Company
like Comcast, BUSINESS INSIDER (Dec. 7, 2012, 12:44 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/how
-much-it-would-cost-google-to-build-a-cable-network-2012-12.
" See Yarrow, supra note 77.
71 See Scott Sloan, Time Warner Cable to Buy Insight for $3 Billion, KENTUCKY.COM (Aug. 16,
2011), http://www.kentucky.com/2011/08/16/1846261/time-warner-cable-to-acquire-major.htm;
Brian Stelter, Comcast Buys Time Warner Cable for $45 billion, CNN MONEY (Feb. 13, 2014, 3:09
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/02/ 13/technology/comcast-time-warner-cable-deal/.
" See Sharon Waxman & Brent Lang, What the Comcast Purchase of Time Warner Cable Means
for Cord-Cutting - and Consolidation, THE WRAP (Feb. 13, 2014, 10:18 AM),
http://www.thewrap.com/comcast-time-warner-cable-consolidation-analysts-cord-cutting-purchase.
" See id. (discussing the consolidation of Time Warner with Comcast and noting that it
"annihilated the bidders").
52 See Cable and Other Pay Television Services, supra note 76.
8 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§§ 4-5, 106 Stat. 1460, 1471-1481 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 534-535 (2012)) (stating that
satellite providers are not included in franchise sections).
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infrastructure. As a result, satellite television is an excellent substitute product for
cable in virtually every market in the country.
The final competitor to cable is IPTV. While cable is subject to the three-tiered
regulatory system, including the requirement of obtaining a franchise, there is an
open question regarding whether IPTV providers must have an additional cable
franchise or whether they can operate within an existing telephone franchise. 4
Regardless of the results of these battles in various jurisdictions around the country,
IPTV is still a physical network. IPTV, like cable, requires a substantial terrestrial
physical infrastructure. As a result, IPTV is limited in this regard. The huge costs
associated with a physical network mean that only a few providers are economically
efficient in a given area. Accordingly, while IPTV is likely to keep growing, it is
currently relatively small on the national stage."
As indicated above, most of the provisions in the laws were intended primarily
for cable television. For instance, must-carry agreements only apply to cable
operators, not to other forms of pay television.8 6 Retransmission consent, however,
affects each type of pay television because all three types of service qualify as
multichannel video programming distributors (MVPD).8 7 As a result, all three
types of services are subject to blackouts of coverage. Blackouts of coverage occur
when content providers do not give their written consent to retransmit their signal
because the content provider and the pay television distributor have not come to
terms on a price for consent.88
There are two distinct kinds of blackouts. The first type of blackout is that of
local broadcast television stations. These stations provide their signal for free over
the air. As indicated in the 1992 Act, all MVPDs must have permission to
retransmit local broadcast signals for subscribers.8 9 In this type of blackout, a
distinction is made between cable operators and the two other forms of pay
television. Recall that only cable television is subject to must-carry provisions.
90
This means that if a particular broadcaster does not have negotiating power, then it
can still elect to have its channel placed on a cable line-up. However, if the
broadcaster has superior negotiating power, then it can charge a fee for its
retransmission consent. The Time Warner/CBS fight is an example of this latter
type of blackout. 9' Satellite and IPTV are not subject to the must-carry provisions
84 See Mediacom Se. L.L.C. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc., 672 F.3d 396, 396-98, 401 (6th Cir.
2012).
85 See Jeffrey Hill, Satellite, IPTV Eating Away at Cable Market Share, VIA SATELLITE (Oct. 23,
2012), http://www.sateUitetoday.com/broadcasting/2012/10/23/sate~lite-iptv-eating-away-at-cable-mar
ket-share (noting that "IPTV services have less penetration than cable or satellite in the U.S. market").
" See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act §§ 4-5.
87 Id. § 6.
88 See Calabrese, supra note 2. This is opposed to a sports blackout, like in the National Football
League, in which a team fails to sell out its home stadium and is blacked out in its local market. Sports
Blackouts, FCC, http://www.fcc.gov/guides/sports-blackouts (last updated Oct. 1, 2014).
89 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act § 6.
SId. §§ 4-5.
"1 See Calabrese, supra note 2. This disagreement ends up in this category because CBS owned the
blacked-out local broadcast stations. Id. In other locations, such as Lexington, Kentucky, CBS was not
2014 - 2015]
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because they are not cable operators.92 Thus, while both types are allowed to show
local broadcast stations, they are not required to do so. For these providers, the
question is how much the fee will be, if any, to retransmit a local broadcast signal.
The retransmission consent type of blackout deals generally with of
non-terrestrial broadcasters. These are content providers that do not broadcast their
signal free over the air. An example of such a provider is ESPN. While ESPN does
not provide its signal over the air, federal communications law still requires pay
television providers to have written permission to broadcast ESPN content to
subscribers, usually for a fee.93 This fee is often referred to as a carriage fee.
94
Because the must-carry rules do not apply here, the battle is over the fee to be paid
to the content provider for retransmission. An example of this is the recent battle
between The Weather Channel and DirecTV over its carriage fee.95
While there are two distinct categories of blackouts, each operates in roughly
the same way and has essentially the same effect. Blackouts of service and/or the
threat of blackouts are the most important tools that cable companies and
broadcasters use in determining market price. Without retransmission consent, pay
television providers cannot show content.96 The result is that blackouts cause
disruption of service and inevitably lead to price increases.97 Blackout battles often
get nasty with companies trying to win in the court of public opinion. Companies
on both sides will often run advertisements in an attempt to get the public to force
the other side to act to stop a blackout.9" During blackouts, as stated above, the
FCC has little power to step in.99
Most blackouts occur because pay television providers balk at the higher prices
that content providers want to charge for their programming. For instance, in the
Time Warner/CBS dispute, Time Warner originally hesitated to pay an increased
retransmission fee from $1 to $2 per subscriber per month.100 The blackout lasted a
blacked out for Time Warner customers because the local CBS affiliate is owned by a third party. In
locations like this, Time Warner negotiates directly with the local affiate for subscriber fees. This is not
to say that local customers were not affected. The author notes that he could not watch programming on
CBS.com or the CBS owned networks of Showtime or The Movie Channel during the blackout
because CBS barred Time Warner Internet customers from using the website.
92 See Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act §§ 4-6.
9 See id.
94 Id. § 4.
s Mark Memmott, 20 Million DirecTV Customers Just Lost The Weather Channel, NPR: THE
TWO-WAY (Jan. 14, 2014, 10:05 AM), http://www.npr.org/blogs/the two-way/2014/01/14/262382556
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BLOG (Mar. 6, 2014, 3:25 PM), http://www.fcc.gov/blog/protecting-television-consumers-protecting
-competition.
97 Id.
" See Todd Spangler, CBS Comes Out Swinging Against Time Warner Cable in Contract Fight,
VARIETY (July 18, 2013, 3:04 PM), http://variety.com/2013/biz/news/cbs-comes-out-swinging-
against-time-warner-cable-in-contract-fight-1200565129.
Press Release, supra note 70, at *1.
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month with Time Warner finally caving in and agreeing to pay the increased fee.' 1
Another example is the DirecTV/ Weather Channel dispute. There, DirecTV
refused to pay The Weather Channel an increased fee, which was reportedly
around an additional penny per subscriber per month.0 2 After three months, the
blackout of The Weather Channel ended but only after The Weather Channel
conceded to DirecTV.
10 3
The reason that cable operators balk at increased fees is that the prices are
eventually passed on to customers. For example, the extra dollar that Time Warner
has to pay to CBS per subscriber is passed on to Time Warner customers in their
monthly subscriptions."0 4 Carriage and retransmission fees have exploded in recent
years, and, in turn, so have monthly subscription prices. For instance, ESPN
receives roughly $5.54 per subscriber per month for each of its roughly 100 million
subscribers. l'0 All of these fees translate to an average cost of $86 for a pay
television subscription.10 6 As a result, cable television subscriptions have decreased
primarily because of these high subscription rates.' 07
As shown above, the price of a pay television subscription is rising because
carriage and retransmission fees are increasing. The primary reason that content
providers are asking for a higher price for retransmission consent is the increased
cost of producing and/or paying for content. This can be most starkly seen through
the increasing rights fees associated with sports programming. A sports rights fee is
the price paid by networks to a sport's governing body for the right to broadcast
that sport. For example, ESPN recently agreed to pay the National Football
League $15.2 billion through 2021 to broadcast NFL games.'08 This means that
ESPN is spending well over $1 billion per year just to broadcast the NFL. ESPN
spends hundreds of millions of dollars on its other programming as well.'0 9 The
high cost of programming is both how and why ESPN charges roughly $5.54 to
each of its 100 million subscribers per month."0 Better content allows ESPN to ask
for higher subscription fees. In turn, the higher fees allow ESPN to bid on
additional content. And ESPN is not the only one. Content providers such as
101 See id.
102 See Memmott, supra note 95.
1"3 Brian Stelter, Weather Channel Coming Back to DirecTV, CNN MONEY (Apr. 8, 2014, 4:44
PM), http://money.cnn.com/2014/04/08/news/companies/diectv-weather-channel (noting that The
Weather Channel "agreed to reduce reality programming by half on weekdays").
104 See Calabrese, supra note 2.
10 See Richard Sandomir et al., To Protect Its Empire, ESPN Stays on Offense, N.Y. TIMES, Aug.
26, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/08/27/sports/ncaafootbaf/to-defend-its-empire-espn-stays
-on-offensive.html.
106 Amadou Diallo, Cable TV Model Not Just Unpopular but Unsustainable, Forbes (Oct. 14,
2013, 9:05 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/amadoudiallo/2013/10/14/cable-tv-price-hikes-unsustain
able/.
107 See IHS, supra note 7.
o Richard Sandomir, ESPN Extends Deal With N.F.L. for $15.2 Bilion, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 8,
2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011 09/09/sports/footbau/espn-extends-deal-with-nfl-for-15-biuion
.html.
'o' See id.
110 See Sandomir et al., supra note 105.
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FOX, CBS, and NBC also pay large sums of money for the right to broadcast
various sporting events.11' The large sums paid for rights fees inevitably eventually
end up in the bottom line of a pay television subscriber's bill.
How can content providers afford to pay for increased rights fees? The simple
answer is bundling. Bundling is the process by which pay television distributors
group certain channels together in a package." 2 Sports, business, and movie
packages are examples of bundling similar channels together. Another example is
offering a higher tier of programming beyond basic cable. In each of these
examples, different channels are placed together and sold as a group."3 Bundling is
an important part of how subscribers receive programming; thus, the presence of
bundling will be important to consider for any proposed solution to blackouts.
Bundling is an essential component of the pay television marketplace because
even if consumers do not watch all the channels they subscribe to, they still pay for
all channels in their package. 114 Economists generally believe bundling is
economically efficient in markets such as pay television when there are high costs of
production and consumers have different preferences for content."' The following
example explains how bundling can be efficient:
Suppose there are two cable TV channels, "sports" and "business," each of which
costs $10 to produce. Suppose fusrther that there are two consumers, one of whom
is willing to pay $7 for the sports channel and $4 for the business channel, while
the other is willing to pay only $4 for sports, but will pay $7 for business. If the
two channels are offered separately, there is no price at which demand will be
sufficient to cover cost: if each is offered for $10 (its cost), no one buys either
channel; if each is offered at $7 and is purchased by one consumer, revenue is $7
and each channel loses $3; and, if each is offered at $4 and purchased by both
consumers, revenue is $8, and each channel loses $2. In short, in an a la carte
world, neither channel is produced.
If bundling is permitted, on the other hand, the two channels can be offered
together for $10, and both consumers (each of whom values the two channels at a
total of $11) will purchase. Revenues are now $20, covering the costs of both
channels, and each consumer receives $1 in consumer surplus." 6
Commentators believe that bundling also helps to reduce cost by allowing content
providers expanded distribution."' 7 More people would subscribe to the channel if
it were sold in a bundle than if the channel were sold individually. Additional
distribution means increased revenues from additional subscribers fees. Moreover,
bundling allows for other revenue streams, such as advertising, to be greater as well.
Because more people subscribe to the channel, the potential reach for advertisers is
11 See id.
112 See id.
113 Id.
114 Id.
115 Jeffrey Eisenach & Adam Thierer, A La Carte Regulation of Pay TV Good Intentions vs.
Good Economics, ENGAGE: J. FEDERALIST SOC'Y PRAC. GROUPS, June 2008, at 150.
116 Id.
117 Id.
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greater. The more people an advertisement can reach, the more broadcasters can
charge. Thus, in a bundle, advertising revenues can be increased, which helps
defray additional costs that would otherwise be passed on as higher subscription
fees."' Furthermore, bundling allows for reduced transaction costs because
providers do not have to constantly add and subtract channels from individual
consumers' subscriptions, as they might if channels were purchased individually in
an a la carte model.1 19
While bundling may reduce cost in some ways, in others it may not. For
instance, ESPN bundles the multiple channels it provides together such as ESPN
and ESPN2. For example, ESPN is available in almost 100 million homes at a cost
of $5.54 per subscriber per month. 2 ° However, customers must pay an additional
fee for access to ESPN2.12' ESPN usually requires pay television providers to
accept its channels as a group.'22 What all of this means is that ESPN takes in over
$500 million in subscriber fees per month. This revenue figure does not include
advertising or other forms of revenue. ESPN uses this cash, available by bundling,
to bid on additional rights fees for sporting events; but, the prices for the rights fees
keep going up. To pay for this, ESPN demands more money for its retransmission
consent from pay television providers. Thus, the concepts of bundling and
retransmission consent work together because both lead to a cycle of escalating fees.
The increased fees lead to blackouts of programming because pay television
providers are often not willing to pay content providers the additional money being
requested.
While the debate on whether bundling is economically efficient or not rages
on, many commentators do not like bundling because it does not help to increase
customer choice. Many people, including politicians, see the extra, unwatched
channels in a subscription as waste.123 This may be why many potential customers
are leaving their cable subscriptions behind.
The last important factor that is having a great impact on the market is the
effect of alternative sources of programming and the presence of "cord-cutters" and
"cord-nevers." Cord-cutting is when a customer quits his or her pay television
subscription. 124 Cord-nevers are those who object to having or who have never had
a pay television subscription. 12' Alternative sources of programming such as Netflix
and Hulu are facilitating the presence of "cord-cutters"1 26 by providing content via
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 See Sandomir et al., supra note 105.
121 ld.
122 Id.
123 Tim Molloy, John McCain Makes the Case for A La Carte Cable (Q&A), THE WRAP
(Sept.12, 2013, 11:42 PM), http://www.thewrap.com/qa-john-mccain-makes-the-case-for-a-la-carte
-cable.
124 Adam Levine-Weinberg, Cutting the Cord? I'm Plugging Mine Back In!, DAILY FINANCE
(Sept. 17, 2013, 5:16 PM) http://www.dailyfinance.com/2013/09/17/cutting-the-cord-im-plugging-mi
ne-back-in/.
125 IHS, supra note 7.
126 See Levine-Weinberg, supra note 124.
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online streaming. These services are considerably cheaper than pay television, with
subscriptions around $10 a month.127 This appears to be greatly impacting the pay
television marketplace because many consumers view this as an adequate substitute
product. In past years, pay television subscriptions have declined. 2 ' In addition to
rising prices associated with blackouts, the surge of online streaming services has
certainly led to decreases in pay television subscriptions. 2 9
The results of decreasing subscriptions present a huge threat to the industry
because pay television distributors and content providers get most of their revenue
through subscriptions. Decreasing subscriptions means less money to pay for new
programming and less profit for existing programming. As margins shrink, pay
television providers will be even less willing to pay increased carriage and
retransmission fees. Thus, blackouts are likely to be more common in the future.
II. POTENTIAL SOLUTIONS
This Note addresses three potential solutions to help solve the issue of
blackouts of service: offering ! la carte cable, providing injunctions for interim
carriage and/or forcing binding arbitration, and implementing additional
regulations.
A. The Radical A La Carte Solution
What is the la carte solution? The i la carte model would force pay television
to offer channels individually as opposed to in a bundle."' The alluring idea behind
A la carte cable is that consumers could choose to purchase only the channels that
they want and, in turn, potentially save money. In addition, proponents argue that
there is more choice and less waste in an A la carte model.1
3
1
A la carte has important political backers that would like to see the proposal
become a reality.1 2 Senator John McCain recently proposed a bill that would
regulate the industry by forcing la carte as an offering."3 Additionally, there is a
Kentucky proposal to force A la carte programming as an option as well. 3 4 Under
the Kentucky bill, the proposal would force cable operators to provide la carte
service as an option, but cable companies would still be allowed to offer bundled
127 See HULU, http://www.hulu.com/plus (last visited Nov. 12, 2014); NETFLIX,
http://movies.netflix.com/WiHome (last visited Nov. 12,2014).
12 IHS, supra note 7.
129 See id.
130 See Ted Johnson, John McCain's A La Carte Cable Bill Gains a Co-Sponsor, VARIETY (July
23, 2013, 12:26 PM), http://variety.com/2013/biz/news/ohn-mccains-cable-bill-1200566913.
131 See Timothy F. Winter, Cable Television Is Just a Cartel, U.S. NEWS (Sept. 16, 2013, 5:30
PM), http://www.usnews.com/debate-dub/should-consumers-be-allowed-to-unbundle-their-cable-pac
kages/the-cable-industry-should-join-the-free-marketlace.
132 SeeJohnson, supra note 130.
133 See id.
134 H.R. 39, 2014 Leg., Reg. Sess. (Ky. 2014).
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packages.' At this point, while unlikely to pass, the bills provide a starting point
for future legislation.
One important aspect of the la carte solution is there currently are no laws
preventing pay television distributors from selling channels la carte. Yet, no major
providers of pay television offer A la carte television. Either this highlights the
market power that pay television providers possess, or it shows that the industry has
elected not to offer la carte on its own.'36 Many analysts believe the latter. In most
geographic markets, consumers now have a choice between a cable provider and
satellite service.' 37 IPTV providers are also available options in some markets. 138 A
strong argument can be made that if la carte is economically viable, then
somebody, somewhere, would offer it.'39 But, at this point, no company has done
SO.
1 4 0
The current regulatory structure of the pay television market means that most
of the laws apply only to cable. 14' While some of the laws apply to other pay
television distributors, any new laws in this area would need to be written to cover
all three major types of pay television services. This would not be hard because
Congress did this before with the 1992 law. Under that law, retransmission consent
must be obtained by any MVPD, which includes all three major types of pay
television.' 42 Thus, for an a la carte solution to be in effect nationwide for all pay
television customers, Congress would need to ensure that the language covers all
MVPDs.
A la carte would radically change the current marketplace because bundling is
now an important part of the pay television market. While proponents of the la
carte model cite the potential cost savings and greater choice,'14  significant
potential problems also exist. First, as indicated above, most economists believe
bundling is an economically efficient model and do not believe that an A la carte
system would make pay television cheaper. 44 In an A la carte model, channels like
135 Id.
136 Eisenach &Thierer, supra note 115.
137 Id.
138 See IHS, supra note 7 (noting IPTV sector's growth in second quarter of 2013 especially in
urban areas where IPTV lured subscribers from satellite providers).
139 Eisenach &Thicrer, supra note 115.
Chloe Albanesius, Verizon Tips A La Carte Internet TV Service in 2015, PCMAG.COM (Sept.
12, 2014, 12:30 PM), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2468402,00.asp (reporting that cable
television companies have vocally resisted the "a la carte approach" for about a decade).
141 See supra text accompanying note 86.
142 Cable Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-385,
§ 6, 106 Stat. 1460, 1482 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 325 (2012)).
143 See Winter, supra note 131.
14 Eisenach & Thierer, supra note 115; Matthew Yglesias, A La Carte ESPN Would Cost $30 a
Month, SLATE MONEYBOX BLOG (July 17, 2013, 1:41 PM), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/
2013/07/17/a la carte-espn.wouldcost 30_a month.html; IfYou'e Paying for Cable, You're Paying
for the Channels You Watch, SLATE MONEYBOX BLOG (Jan. 26, 2013, 12:57 PM),
http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/01/26/cable-unbundlinga la carte-is-not-the-miracle_i
t-seems.html [hereinafter Paying for Cable].
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ESPN could cost up to $30 per subscriber per month. 45 While this could save
money for customers who do not watch sports, the vast majority of people would
not actually save money. An FCC study in 2004 indicated that the average person
watches only seventeen channels in their subscriptions. 146 Certainly, each individual
customer does not watch the same seventeen channels as every other customer.
Nonetheless, bundling allows for greater distribution of all channels, thus
decreasing the average channel cost per subscriber. Bundling means that, in
general, channels are cheaper in a bundle than they would be A la carte.
Additionally, studies cast doubt on the potential cost saving of the A la carte model.
One such study suggests the average customer would save only thirty-five cents
with unbundled channels. 147 Moreover, commentators speculate ± la carte packages
might hurt or even destroy a good portion of quality programming. 14' The
importance of choice may be an important policy factor, yet if prices are unlikely to
fall in an a la carte model, then blackouts would likely still be a possibility in an d la
carte world.
B. Injunctions and Forced Arbitration as a Solution
A second approach is to give the FCC the ability to sue for an injunction
and/or force mandatory binding arbitration. The battles over retransmission
consent are the result of private negotiation. 49 The FCC maintains that it does not
have the ability to impose an injunction in response to a blackout or to force
negotiating companies into binding arbitration.50 The FCC will only seek to make
sure parties negotiating retransmission consent fees do so in good faith. 5' This is a
significant limitation on the ability of the FCC to prevent and control blackouts.
Under existing regulatory framework, there is little more the FCC can accomplish
without a statutory change. For the FCC to be able to sue for an injunction or force
mandatory arbitration of parties negotiating retransmission consent, the change
would have to come by statute.
Giving the FCC the ability to sue for an injunction to force interim carriage
and/or force mandatory binding arbitration has a variety of pros and cons. Two
large pros include the FCC would have the ability to keep blackouts from occurring
and to help to bring blackouts to a speedy end. As stated above, blackouts are a
powerful negotiation tool in the pay television industry.1 2 Blackouts can be
145 Yglesias, supra note 144.
146 Amy Schatz & Joe Flint, FCC May Endorse Cable A la Carte, In a Policy Shift, WALL ST. J.
(Nov. 29, 2005, 12:01 AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/artides/SB113323293561108783.
147 Dmitri Byzalov, Unbundling Cable Television: An Empirical Investigation 7 (July 2010)
(working paper), available at http://astro.temple.edu/-dbyzTalov/cable.pdf.
141 See Brent Lang & Tony Maglio, Why A La Carte Cable Could Kill TVs Golden Age, THE
WRAP (Sept. 12, 2013, 11:34 PM), http://www.thewrap.com/why-a-la-carte-cable-could-kill-tvs
-golden-age; see also Paying for Cable, supra note 144.149 See Press Release, supra note 70, at *1.
150 Id.
151 id.
152 See supra text accompanying notes 89-95.
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protracted. For instance, the Time Warner/CBS blackout lasted over a month."5 3
Giving the FCC the ability to order mandatory carriage through an injunction
would help keep programming on the air and protect consumers. When
broadcasters and pay television distributors cannot come to an agreement, channels
would stay on the air because the FCC could force them to stay on the air. Thus,
blackouts could be avoided in the first place. Additionally, giving the FCC the
ability to force mandatory binding arbitration would mean that the FCC could help
reduce the length of time that blackouts last. Arbitration could help the FCC bring
blackouts to a speedy end and/or prevent them entirely by either forcing parties
into an ultimate solution or having the threat of a binding solution.
The major disadvantage to this proposal is that there is virtually no guarantee
that prices would not continue to rise. While blackouts could be reduced, the
market would still set the price of retransmission consent. While this may not
inherently be a bad thing, prices may still rise based on increased
carriage/retransmission consent fees. Thus, between the two problems of blackouts
and the increased costs associated with them, this solution likely only solves one of
them.
C. Additional Regulation as a Solution
The third solution is to provide additional regulation within the existing
framework. Currently, the biggest tool the FCC has within the existing framework
is the ability to make sure that companies negotiate in good faith."4 The FCC has
proposed additional regulations along these lines in the past.15 The idea of the
proposed regulations was to have a greater definition of what constitutes good faith
negotiation. This is certainly a good place to start when looking to reduce blackouts
and the rising costs associated with them. While the FCC maintains it does not
have the ability to order interim carriage or force binding arbitration,15 6 a
clarification of what constitutes "good faith" could help greatly reduce blackouts of
service.
The FCC's previous proposed rules sought to demonstrate what does or does
not constitute a good faith negotiation. For example, the proposed rules aspired to
illuminate what constitutes a per se violation of good faith negotiations.
5 7
Additionally, the proposed rules suggested that a refusal to enter into non-binding
153 Kyle Stock, The CBS Blackout Was a Horror Show for Time Warner Cable, BLOOMBERG
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-was-a-horror-show-for-time-wamer-cable ("Time Warner Cable . . . lost almost 3 percent of its TV
subscribers in the recent quarter, a period that included a month when it didn't broadcast CBS ...
154 47 C.F.R. § 76.65(a) (2013).
115 Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 76 Fed. Reg.
17,071, 17,076 (proposed Mar. 28, 2011) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 76).
s56 See Press Release, supra note 70, at "1.
15 Amendment of the Commission's Rules Related to Retransmission Consent, 76 Fed. Reg. at
17,076-78 (suggesting, among other things, that it could be a per se violation "for a station to grant
another station or station group the right to negotiate or the power to approve its retransmission consent
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mediation could be considered a violation of the good faith provision."' 8 Finally,
the proposed rules clarified what constitutes an unreasonable delay in
negotiations." 9 These rules, which did not become law, help clarify what
constitutes good faith negotiation and could potentially reduce the number of
blackouts.
This proposal is advantageous because industry players would be on notice of
what tactics they could and could not use when negotiating for retransmission
consent. The threat of not negotiating in good faith could be a significant deterrent
to future blackouts.
Unfortunately for consumers, these proposed rules would not eliminate the
threat of blackouts of service completely. Current market players would still be in
control of the process. Thus, blackouts would remain a powerful tool for
retransmission consent battles. Skeptics of these proposed regulations will say that
the rules would only seek to serve as a caution for players in the industry and not as
an active deterrent, thus blackouts would remain a pressing problem.
III. GIVING THE FCC MORE POWER IS THE BEST SOLUTION
Looking at the potential solutions to solve the blackout problem, the best
solution is to give the FCC more power by allowing for an injunction to provide
interim carriage and/or forced binding arbitration. This proposal is the best
solution because it helps to prevent blackouts in the first place. 60 Forced arbitration
and/or an injunction to force interim carriage would mean blackouts could be
prevented while negotiations take place.'
6'
Opponents and skeptics of this proposal will note that giving the FCC more
power would not necessarily stem the tide of rising prices of a pay television
subscription. While this is true, the proposal does help to eliminate one of the most
annoying and aggravating parts of a pay television subscription: a blackout.
62
Additionally, the other proposals do not help to reduce cost either. 163 Evidence
suggests that the costs of individual channels would rise in an la carte model.
164
For example, ESPN would likely cost $30 per month in an A la carte model instead
of its current price of more than $5 per month. 6  Additional evidence suggests
customers would only save thirty-five cents per month in an unbundled model.
66
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Thus, la carte is not actually solving the problem of high consumer cost.
Furthermore, additional regulation is also highly unlikely to help stem prices
because blackouts and the threat of blackouts would still be present under that
framework.
While the forced interim carriage and/or forced arbitration has no guarantee of
reducing prices, it would represent a new arena for market players because they
could avoid a blackout of service, at least in the short term.'67 The ability to prevent
blackouts, or at least lessen their length, symbolizes a significant potential
improvement over the status quo in the current marketplace. While blackouts hurt
pay television distributors and content providers in the short term, both end up
making more money in the end by increased rates. Customers will then end up
footing the bill and not getting to enjoy the programming they pay for while
negotiations continue. While forced arbitration and/or interim carriage would not
fully solve the problem of rising prices, it would mean that customers could at least
enjoy the programming they pay for without the interruption of a blackout of
service.
CONCLUSION
Blackouts are a part of the pay television marketplace. Currently, they are
annoying yet seemingly unavoidable. Though there are several potential solutions
to the problem of blackouts, giving the FCC the ability to order interim carriage
and/or force binding arbitration would certainly help. While this proposal does not
solve all of the ills of the pay television marketplace, it would help to significantly
reduce potential blackouts of service for customers. As a result, this proposal
represents a realistic additional law to the existing marketplace Congress should
consider in order to protect customers from blackouts.
16 Presumably, if parties could not come to an agreement eventually, then the FCC would not force
the parties to work with each other in perpetuity.
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